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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In the Summer of 2020, Americans took to the streets to 
protest the killing of George Floyd and police brutality.1 In 
response to these protests, the Colorado legislature passed 
House Bill 1424.2 House Bill 1424 creates social equity cannabis3 
licenses for individuals directly impacted by the war on drugs.4 
Specifically, social equity applicants receive reduced 
application and licensing fees, mentorship, and grants.5 
 
1 See Diana Novak Jones, Social Equity Lags Behind Progress in Pot 
Industry, LAW360 (Jun. 12, 2020), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1281023/social-equity-lags-
behind-progress-in-pot-industry. 
2 Diana Novak Jones, Colorado Gov. Signs Cannabis Social Equity Bill 
into Law, LAW360 (Jun. 30, 2020), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1288074/colorado-gov-signs-
cannabis-social-equity-bill-into-law. 
3 In this article, I use the term “cannabis” as much as possible, both 
because of the racial origins of “marijuana” in prohibition campaigns 
and the more positive connotation “cannabis” has compared to 
marijuana. Konstantia Koutouki & Katherine Lofts, Cannabis, 
Reconciliation, and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Prospects and 
Challenges for Cannabis Legalization in Canada, 56 ALBERTA L. REV. 709, 
710 n.3 (2019); Francis J. Mootz III, Ethical Cannabis Lawyering in 
California, 9 ST. MARY’S  J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 6, n.1 (2018); Alex 
Halperin, Marijuana: Is It Time to Stop Using a Word with Racist Roots?, 
THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/jan/29/marijuana-
name-cannabis-racism. Where context requires, I use the terms 
“marijuana” or “marihuana” and they should be considered 
synonymous with “cannabis.” 
4 H.B. 20-1424, 72nd Gen. Assemb., 2020 Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2020). 
Under House Bill 1424, a social equity applicant must demonstrate at 
least one the following; (1) Reside for at least fifteen years between 
the years 1980 and 2010 in an opportunity zone or designated as a 
disparately impacted by the war on drugs; (2) the applicant or the 
applicant’s parent, legal guardian, sibling, spouse, child, or minor in 
their guardianship was arrested, convicted, or subjected to civil asset 
forfeiture for a cannabis offense; or (3) the applicant’s household 
income does not exceed an amount determined by a state licensing 
authority. House Bill 20-1424. In addition, the social equity licensee 
or collectively one or more social equity licensees must hold at least 
fifty-one percent of the beneficial ownership of the cannabis license. 
See id.  
5 Id.  





Colorado Governor Jared Polis formally signed House Bill 1424 
into law on June 29, 2020 and will go into effect on January 1, 
2021.6 Notably, Governor Polis signed House Bill 1424 outside 
Denver’s Simply Pure Dispensary, owned and operated by 
Wanda James.7 James is believed to be America’s first black 
cannabis dispensary owner.8   
James is just one of many entrepreneurs participating in 
America’s “green rush.”9 As of 2020, 11 states have legalized 
recreational cannabis.10 Approximately 55 million Americans 
use cannabis regularly.11  
 
6 Id.; see also Charles Feldmann, How Colorado Continues to Cultivate 
Cannabis Equity, HOBAN LAW GROUP (Jul. 2, 2020), 
https://hoban.law/2020/07/how-colorado-continues-to-cultivate-
cannabis-equity/. 
7 Joey Bunch, Polis signs social equity bill for Colorado marijuana 




8 Maudlyne Ihejirika, Nation’s 1st African American pot shop owner 
laments: ‘We still need more ownership by black and brown people,’ CHI. 
SUN TIMES (Jan. 31, 2020), 
https://chicago.suntimes.com/cannabis/2020/1/31/21076466/wan
da-james-simply-pure-talks-journey-to-nations-1st-black-owned-
cannabis-dispensary. Colorado’s state Marijuana Enforcement 
Department Division’s most-recent survey on cannabis business 
ownership found that eighty-eight percent of Colorado cannabis 
owners are white. See Thomas Mitchell, Polis Signs Bill Granting Him 
Power to Pardon Past Weed Crimes, WESTWORLD (Jun. 30, 2020), 
https://www.westword.com/marijuana/marijuana-pardons-
colorado-governor-social-equity-drug-war-11735035. 
9 “Green Rush” is a term that refers to the growing American 
cannabis industry. See Alexis N. Stein, The Green Rush, at 5 (Dec. 17, 
2019) (unpublished thesis, Coastal Carolina Univ.) (on file with the 
Coastal Carolina Univ. Digital Commons), 
https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=13
59&context=honors-theses. 
10 John I. Winn, When the Going Gets Weird, The Weird Turn Pro: 
Management Best Practices in the Age of Medicinal Marijuana, 25 ROGER 
WILLIAMS UNIV. L. REV. 60, 60-61 (2020). While not discussed in this 
article, 33 states have legalized medicinal cannabis. See id. at 61. 
11 See Nick Charles, Black entrepreneurs struggle to join legal weed 
industry, NBC NEWS (Feb. 11, 2020), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/black-entrepreneurs-
struggle-join-legal-weed-industry-n1132351. 
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Cannabis’ increased societal acceptance promises 
economic gain. In 2020, the cannabis industry expects growth 
of 700%.12 By 2026, the cannabis industry is estimated to be 
worth $50 billion.13  
 Unfortunately, despite cannabis’ economic potential, 
white entrepreneurs dominate the cannabis industry – 
approximately 81% of cannabis business owners and founders 
are white.14 This vast disparity is unjust as the war on drugs 
disparately impacted minorities.15 Minorities entering the 
cannabis industry cite various concerns, such as high startup 
costs and prior drug convictions, that would bar them from 
receiving state cannabis licenses.16 In response, states have 
implemented various social equity programs to encourage 
minority participation in the burgeoning recreational cannabis 
industry.17 While these programs have noble intentions, 
multiple courts have struck down some of these programs as 
 
12 Kristen Clarke, Cannabis industry shouldn't expand until we fix 





14 Judith Ohikuare, Can Black Women Do Good & Get Rich In Big 
Cannabis?, REFINERY29 (Jun. 22, 2018), 
https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2018/06/195690/black-
women-starting-cannabis-businesses. Comparatively, African 
Americans are at 4.7%, and Latinos are at 5.7% of cannabis business 
owners or founders. See id. 
15 See United States v. Willis, 967 F.2d 1220, 1226 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(Heaney, J., concurring) ([Disparate treatment between crack raids 
by race] makes the war on drugs "look like a war on minorities."); 
Juan R. Torruella, Deja Vu: A Federal Judge Revisits the War on Drugs, 
or Life in a Balloon, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 167, 193 (2011) (“One of the 
most problematic, even if probably unintended, consequences of the 
"War on Drugs" has been its disparate impact on minorities in this 
country.”); Benjamin D. Steiner & Victor Argothy, White Addiction: 
Racial Inequality, Racial Ideology, and the War on Drugs, 10 TEMP. POL. 
& CIV. RTS. L. REV. 443, 443-44 (2001). 
16 Charles, supra note 11. 
17 Id.  





being impermissible racial classifications.18 In addition, some of 
these programs do not grant many minorities licenses.19 
 This article analyzes the various state social equity 
programs for minorities in the recreational cannabis industry. 
Part II examines the history of the war on drugs and its 
disparate impact on minorities. Part III depicts the various state 
social equity programs concerning the recreational cannabis 
industry and considers their Constitutionality. Part IV proposes 
a state statute that passes Constitutional scrutiny and utilizes 
the best parts of the various state social equity systems. The 
proposed statute encourages minority participation in the 
cannabis industry by offering inexpensive cannabis licenses, 
giving preference to those directly impacted by the war on 
drugs, offering mentorship to applicants, and by providing 
grants to assist in the operation of their cannabis business. 
II. THE DRUGS OF WAR 
 America’s history is implanted with cannabis. This 
section explores American history showcasing cannabis’s 
transition from legality to illegality. In early American history, 
cannabis was used for both medicinal and industrial 
purposes.20 This acceptance changed in the early twentieth 
 
18 Pure Ohio Wellness, LLC. v. State of Ohio Brd. Of Pharmacy, CVH 




Pharmacann Ohio, LLC v. Ohio Dept. Commerce, 17 CV 10962, (C.P. 






19 Kris Krane, A Tale of Two Markets: How Illinois Succeeded in Rollout 




20 Susan David Dwyer, The Hemp Controversy: Can Industrial Hemp 
Save Kentucky, 86 KY. L.J.  1143, 1157 (1998). 
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century over xenophobic and racist sentiments.21 In the mid-
twentieth century, the war on drugs caused destruction in 
minority communities.22  
a. PEACE BEFORE WAR 
 For much of American history, cannabis was not illegal 
.23 Some scholars believe cannabis plants first came to North 
America from Asia over 10,000 years ago.24 In 1524, Italian 
explorer Giovanni da Verrazzano discovered cannabis growing 
wild in present-day Virginia.25 Some of the earliest uses of 
American cannabis use date to the Jamestown colony where 
colonists were ordered to plant hemp, an industrial variant of 
cannabis.26 Other colonies, like the Massachusetts Bay, 
Connecticut, and the Chesapeake Bay colonies, had similar 
orders requiring hemp cultivation.27 Hemp production 
continued throughout the era and both Thomas Jefferson and 
George Washington cultivated hemp.28 The 1850 United States 
census noted 8327 hemp farms of at least 2000 acres each existed 
within the United States showcasing hemp’s common use and 
cultivation.29  
 
21 See David Schlussel, The Mellow Pot-Smoker: White Individualism in 
Marijuana Legalization Campaigns, 105 CAL. L. REV. 885, 895 (2017). 
22 Id. at 900. 
23 See K.K. DuVivier, State Ballot Initiatives in the Federal Preemption 
Equation: A Medical Marijuana Case Study, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
221, 275 (2005). 
24 Marty Bergoffen & Roger Lee Clark, Hemp as an Alternative to Wood 
Fiber in Oregon, 11 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG., 119, 120-21 (1996). 
25 See generally, Lizaveta Sergeev. The Analyses of State and Federal 
Medical Marijuana Laws and How They Apply to Employment, at 8 
(2011) (unpublished thesis, Univ. of Nev. L. V.) (on file with the 
Digital Scholarship at Univ. of Nev. L.V.), 
https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=20
70&context=thesesdissertations.  
26See Dwyer, supra note 20, at 1156, n.102. 
27 Id.  
28 See Florence Shu-Acquaye, The Role of States in Shaping the Legal 
Debate on Medical Marijuana, 42 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 697, 703 
(2016). Benjamin Franklin, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton 
all extoled hemp’s virtues. Christen D. Shepherd, Lethal Concentration 
of Power: How the D.E.A. Acts Improperly to Prohibit the Growth of 
Industrial Hemp, 68 UMKC L. REV. 239, 239 n.3 (1999). 
29 See Dwyer, supra note 20, at 1157, n.104. 





During that same time period, cannabis use expanded 
beyond industrial uses. American medical practitioners 
recognized cannabis’s medicinal value.30 Cannabis was used as 
a treatment for a variety of ailments such as neuralgia, gout, 
tetanus, stomach pain, cholera, convulsions, and depression.31  
 Cannabis’s medicinal uses sparked its earliest 
regulations in America.32 In the early 20th century, 
unscrupulous snake oil salesmen marketed “miracle cures” 
containing odd concoctions of ingredients including cannabis.33 
These “miracle cures” were even marketed to children and 
could also contain opium and alcohol.34 In response, the federal 
government passed the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 
requiring the labeling of ingredients contained within certain 
products,35 creating cannabis’s first federal regulation.36 
b. EARLY BATTLES 
The proliferation of these “miracle cures” occurred after 
America experienced an influx of immigrants and 
urbanization.37 A number of Mexican immigrants entered the 
Southwestern United States after the Mexican Revolution of 
1910 bringing with them their native customs including 
recreational cannabis use.38 During this time, cannabis use 
 
30 See Michael Vitiello, Marijuana Legalization, Racial Disparity, and the 
Hope for Reform, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 789, 792 (2019). 
31 See Michael Berkey, Mary Jane's New Dance: The Medical Marijuana 
Legal Tango, 9 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 417, 420-21 (2011). 
32 Vitiello, supra note 30, at 794. 




34 Vitiello supra note 30, at 793. 
35 Pure Food and Drugs Act, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906); Vitiello 
supra note 30, at 794. 
36 See United States v. Taylor, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136669, at *6 
(W.D. Mich. Sept. 8, 2014). 
37 See Michael F. Linden, Seeing Through the Smoke: The Origins of 
Marijuana Prohibition in the United States, at 15 (Apr. 2015) 
(unpublished thesis, Wesleyan Univ.) (on file with Digital 
Collections at Wesleyan Univ.), 
https://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2464
&context=etd_hon_theses. 
38 Berkey, supra note 31, at 421. 
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remained a local concern with little outcry.39 The earliest 
incident of a racial cannabis scare dates back to 1913 in El Paso, 
Texas.40 That incident involved a Mexican man supposedly 
high on cannabis who chased a couple, stabbed a team of 
horses, killed a police officer, and wounded another police 
officer.41 Police stated the man, who they referred to as a “fiend” 
had been smoking cannabis all day.42 In response to the 
incident, El Paso became the first city in the United States to 
pass an ordinance banning cannabis in 1914.43 
 Localities justified cannabis prohibitions with racism 
and xenophobia.44 Supporters of cannabis bans often used racist 
language in calling for bans.45  California and Texas officials 
 
39 Id.  
40 See id. 
41 Trish Long, 1915: El Paso becomes first city in United States to outlaw 
marijuana, EL PASO TIMES (Nov. 14, 2019), 
https://www.elpasotimes.com/story/news/2019/11/14/el-paso-
history-pot-possession-first-city-outlaw-weed-tbt/2579079001/. 
42 Id.   
43 Elena Quattrone, The "Catch-22" of Marijuana Legalization, 22 B.U.J. 
SCI. & TECH. L. 299, 307 (2016). 
44 See United States v. Bannister, 786 F. Supp. 2d 617, 646 (E.D.N.Y. 
2011) (“[A] series of drug prohibitions in American history [were] 
prompted in part by fears of and distaste for distinct ethnic or racial 
minority groups.”); Sandra M. Praxmarer, Note, Blazing a New Trail: 
Using a Federalism Standard of Review in Marijuana Cases, 85 GEO. 
WASH. L . REV. ARGUENDO 25, 33 (2017). 
45See e.g. Alex Kreit, Drug Truce, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1323, 1342 (2016) 
(“When some beet-field peon takes a few puffs of [cannabis], he 
thinks he has just been elected president of Mexico, so he starts out 
to execute all his political enemies.”); Barbara Fedders, Opioid 
Policing, 94 IND. L.J. 389, 399 (2019) (“All Mexicans are crazy, and this 
[cannabis] makes them crazy.”). In New Orleans, newspaper articles 
associated cannabis with African Americans, jazz musicians and 
underworld whites. One critic stated, “The dominant race and most 
enlightened countries are alcoholic,” the critic continued, “whilst the 
races and nations addicted to hemp . . . have deteriorated both 
mentally and physically.” ERIC SCHLOSSER REEFER MADNESS: SEX, 
DRUGS, AND CHEAP LABOR IN THE AMERICAN BLACK MARKET 19 
(2003).  In the 19th century opium bans were also justified on racist 
sentiments against the Chinese. See e.g. Ex parte Yung Jon, 28 F. 308, 
312 (D. Ore. 1886) (“[The Opium den ban] proceeds more from a 
desire to vex and annoy the ‘Heathen Chinee’[sic] . . . than to protect 
the people from the evil habit.").   





told the public that cannabis caused Mexican immigrants to 
become violent and that Mexican immigrants distributed 
cannabis to children.46 In the South, anti-cannabis crusaders 
claimed that the drug made African Americans violent and 
called for bans.47 The resilience of these dubious claims gained 
public acceptance based on white fears over new immigrants 
and economic anxieties over job loss from new immigrants.48 By 
1933, thirty-four states outlawed recreational cannabis use 
though cannabis remained legal federally.49  
 The federal government’s involvement in cannabis 
regulation stemmed from the efforts of Harry J. Anslinger, the 
Commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.50 During his 
early years at the Federal Bureau, Anslinger dismissed the idea 
that cannabis caused violence or harmed its users.51 Some 
commentators suggest Anslinger changed his beliefs about 
cannabis out of job security concerns after alcohol prohibition 
 
46 See Schlussel, supra note 21 at 895-96; see also SCHLOSSER, supra note 
45, at 19. 
47 Steven W. Bender, The Colors of Cannabis: Race and Marijuana, 50 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 689, 690 (2016). Cannabis opponents also claimed 
the substance caused white women to be seduced by African 
American men. Id. Racist language like this is still used today. See 
Maybell Romero, Viewing Access to Justice for Rural Mainers of Color 
through a Prosecution Lens, 71 ME. L. REV. 227, 229 (2018). For 
example, in 2016, Maine Governor Paul LePage stated “These are 
guys by the name D-Money, Smoothie, Shifty—these types of guys 
that come from Connecticut and New York; they come up here, they 
sell their heroin, then they go back home. Incidentally, half the time 
they impregnate a young, white girl before they leave. Which is a 
real sad thing because then we have another issue that we have to 
deal with down the road.” See MICHAEL T. SOLOMON WHERE HAVE 
ALL THE BLACK PEOPLE GONE?: THE PARADOX OF RACE, CULTURE, AND 
POLITICS IN THE SHADOW OF BARACK OBAMA 93-94 (2019).  
48 Thomas J. Moran, Note, Just a Little Bit of History Repeating: The 
California Model of Marijuana Legalization and How it Might Affect 
Racial and Ethnic Minorities, 17 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 557, 
561 (2015). 
49 Schussel, supra note 21, at 896. 
50 See Quattrone, supra note 43, at 306-07. 
51 Ruth C. Stern & J. Herbie DiFonzo, The End of the Red Queen's Race: 
Medical Marijuana in the New Century, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 673, 682 
(2009). 
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ended.52 Anslinger made explicitly racist appeals when urging 
for cannabis prohibition claiming cannabis caused violence, 
insanity, suicidal thoughts, and sexual promiscuity.53 
Anslinger’s supposed “scientific evidence” showing negative 
effects of cannabis was fabricated.54 These racist appeals 
eventually earned Congress’s attention.55 In 1937, Anslinger 
testified before Congress and told fictious stories that cannabis 
led two individuals high on cannabis to kill a police officer in 
Chicago, that cannabis was a gateway drug to heroine, and that 
two African-American men impregnated a white college 
student because the men were high on cannabis.56  
In response to Anslinger’s testimony, Congress passed 
the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 (“MTA”) representing the 
federal government’s first federal law meant to discourage 
cannabis use.57 The MTA did not outlaw cannabis,58 but it was 
 
52 Craig Brand, USA: Protecting Unnecessary Federal Drug War Budgets 




53 RUDOLPH J. GERBER, LEGALIZING MARIJUANA: DRUG POLICY REFORM 
AND PROHIBITION POLITICS 4-9 (2004). For example, Anslinger once 
stated that “reefer makes darkies think they're as good as white 
men,” (quoting Matthew J. Routh, Re-Thinking Liberty: Cannabis 
Prohibition and Substantive Due Process, 26 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 
145 (2017)). Other racist quotations from Anslinger are readily 
available. See JEFF DITCHFIELD & MEL THOMAS, THE MEDICAL 
CANNABIS GUIDEBOOK 17-19 (2014), https://saltonverde.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/14-
The_Medical_Cannabis_Guidebook.pdf. 
54 GERBER, supra note 53, at 6. 
55 See Schlussel, supra note 21, at 897. 
56 GERBER, supra note 53, at 10-11. 
57 26 U.S.C. § 4741 (1964), repealed by Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, tit. Ill, § I 
101(b)(3)(A), 84 Stat. 1292; Christine A. Kolosov, Comment, 
Evaluating the Public Interest: Regulation of Industrial Hemp Under the 
Controlled Substances Act, 57 UCLA L. REV. 237, 245 (2009). 
58 See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 21 (1969); Kasey C. Phillips, 
Drug War Madness: A Call for Consistency Amidst the Conflict, 13 CHAP. 
L. REV. 645, 654 (2010) 





so burdensome both financially and procedurally that it made 
compliance virtually impossible.59 
In the 1950s, Congress again, at the urging of Anslinger, 
enacted the 1951 Boggs Act and the 1956 Narcotics Control Act, 
which in conjunction increased criminal penalties and 
established mandatory minimums for cannabis possession.60 
c. TOTAL WAR AND ITS COSTS 
Anslinger’s early efforts laid the groundwork for the 
total war on drugs waged by later presidential administrations.  
President Richard Nixon started ramping up the war on 
drugs.61 Nixon was elected president by tapping into white 
anxieties about race, civil rights, and domestic unrest by calling 
for “law and order.”62 The war on drugs encompassed Nixon’s 
broader “law and order” strategy.63 Nixon promised a total war 
on drugs stating, “America's public enemy number one in the 
United States is drug abuse. In order to fight and defeat this 
enemy, it is necessary to wage a new, all-out offensive.”64 Years 
later, former Nixon advisor John Ehrlichman revealed that 
Nixon’s war on drugs specifically targeted Nixon’s political 
enemies including the minority community.65 
 
59 See Seeley v. State, 940 P.2d 604, 614 n.10 (Wash. 1997) (Sanders, J., 
dissenting) (describing the MTA as so burdensome both financially 
and procedurally that it virtually eliminated any legal medical, 
industrial, or recreational use of cannabis.). The MTA was ultimately 
held to be unconstitutional as it violated the Fifth Amendment’s 
guarantee against self-incrimination. See Leary, 395 U.S. at 37. 
60 See Cynthia Brown, Beyond the Money: Expected (and unexpected) 
Consequences of America's War on Drugs, 4 LINCOLN MEM’L U. L. REV. 
118, 134-36 (2017).  
61  See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 10 (2005); Alfred W. McCoy, 
From Free Trade to Prohibition, A Critical History of the Modern Asian 
Opium Trade, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 307, 330 (2000). 
62 Schlussel, supra note 21, at 898. 
63 See id.  
64 President Richard M. Nixon, Remarks About an Intensified Program 
for Drug Abuse Prevention and Control, (Jun. 17, 1971), AM. PRESIDENCY 
PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-
about-intensified-program-for-drug-abuse-prevention-and-control. 
65 Ira P. Robbins, Guns N' Ganja: How Federalism Criminalizes the 
Lawful Use of Marijuana, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1783, 1808-09 (2018); 
Tom LoBianco, Report: Aide Says Nixon’s War on Drugs Targeted 
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Nixon’s efforts led to the creation of the Controlled 
Substances Act (“CSA”).66 Cannabis is classified as a Schedule I 
drug under the CSA.67 This classification is significant. As a 
Schedule I drug, cannabis is deemed to have no medicinal value 
and all uses are strictly prohibited.68 This prohibition federally 
criminalizes the manufacturing, distribution, or possession of 
any amount of cannabis.69 The CSA laid the groundwork for an 
even larger war on drugs that launched in the 1980s.70 
In the 1980s, the Reagan administration ratcheted up the 
war on drugs and increased criminal penalties for drug 
offenses, along with massively expanding the drug 
enforcement budget.71 As President Ronald Reagan increased 
funds to wage the war on drugs, he slashed funds for drug 
treatment and education.72 Reagan’s successor, George H.W. 
Bush, continued the Reagan administration’s anti-drug 
 
Blacks, Hippies, CNN (Mar. 24, 2016), 
https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/23/politics/john-ehrlichman-
richard-nixon-drug-war-blacks hippie/index.html.  
66 See Quattrone, supra note 43, at 302. 
67 The Controlled Substance Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2012). 
Cannabis remains at a Schedule I classification alongside heroine 
and LSD. See Grant M. Hamel, Comment, Waiting for the Waitlist: The 
Case for State Protection of Medical Marijuana Users Against Denial of 
Organ Transplant, 49 U. TOL. L. REV. 115, 128 (2017). Many cannabis 
proponents point out that cocaine is classified as a Schedule II drug 
despite killing over 4,000 Americans a year. Anastasia Hautanen, 
Seeing through the Haze: Navigating Veteran Employment Rights in 
Government Contracting, Medical Marijuana, and the Drug-Free 
Workplace Act of 1988,49 PUB. CONT. L.J. 371, 377-78 (2020). By 
contrast, cannabis has no reported deaths directly related to 
substance use. Id. at 378. 
68 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2012). 
69 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012). 
70 See Vitiello, supra note 30, at 804. 
71 IAN HANEY LOPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL 
APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM AND WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS 
51-52 (2013) (describing how during Reagan’s first term an increase 
in anti-drug funds at the FBI from $ 38 million to $ 181 million; and 
an increase in the Drug Enforcement Agency budget from $ 86 
million to $ 1 billion). 
72 Schlussel, supra note 21, at 899. 





policies.73 Bush increased anti-drug enforcement spending,74 
and appointed William Bennet as “drug czar” who advocated 
for the death penalty for drug dealers.75 
Journalists and Democrats acquiesced to Reagan’s and 
Bush’s scorched-earth drug war policies giving the total war 
bipartisan support.76 This bipartisan support continued when 
Democratic President Bill Clinton, escalated the war on drugs 
by pushing “three strike laws” and signing a $30 billion funding 
“law and order” bill for prisons and police agencies.77  
d. THE DEVASTATING EFFECTS OF TOTAL WAR 
 
The bipartisan and devasting policies of the war on 
drugs live with us today.78  Even as overall drug arrests started 
to decline in 2006, cannabis arrests accelerated and were more 
than half of all drug arrests by 2010.79 Approximately 88% of 
cannabis arrests are for unlawful possession rather than 
trafficking in drugs.80 Despite similar cannabis usage among 
 
73 Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or 
“Why the War on Drugs" Was a "War on Blacks,” 6 J. GENDER, RACE & 
JUST.  381, 387 (2002). 
74 Bush’s drug war budget in 1991 was $ 10 billion and constituted a 
62% increase over the 1989 budget. John A. Powell & Eileen B. 
Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War: The National Purse, The 
Constitution, and the Black Community, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 557, 567 
(1991). 
75 Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War's 
Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 36 n.4 (1998). 
76See, MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS 
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 52-55 (2010).  
77 Schlussel, supra note 21, at 899-900. More than three times as many 
people were arrested for cannabis while Bill Clinton was President 
than Richard Nixon. SCHLOSSER, supra note 45, at 48-49. 
78 See Rebecca Brown, Cannabis Social Equity: An Opportunity for the 
Revival of Affirmative Action in California, 3 SOC. JUST. & EQUITY L.J. 
205, 225 (2019). 
79 AM. C.L. UNION, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE: 
BILLIONS OF DOLLARS WASTED ON RACIALLY BIASED ARRESTS 36-37 
(2013). 
80 Bender, supra note 47, 691 n*12. 
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racial groups,81 minorities are more likely to be arrested,82 
prosecuted,83 and face incarceration from judges84 than white 
offenders.85 These factors place many non-violent minority 
drug offenders in prison.86 
The war on drugs greatly contributed to both mass 
incarceration and the racialization of American prisons.87 In less 
than thirty years, the American prison population spiked from 
300,000 to more than 2 million largely from drug convictions.88 
Drug convictions account for two-thirds of the rise in federal 
inmate population.89 Minorities make up sixty percent of the 
American prison population while whites account for only 
thirty-nine percent.90 
 
81 Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Discretion, 81 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 157, 182 n. 122 (2013). 
82 AM. C.L. UNION, supra note 79, at 17–20; Blacks are three times 
more likely to be arrested for drug offenses and nearly ten more 
likely to be imprisoned for a drug offense than whites. Baradaran, 
supra note 81, at 200. Other studies show black drivers are more 
likely to be stopped by police than other racial groups, despite blacks 
having a lower probability of carrying large amounts of drugs than 
other racial groups. See Katherine Y. Barnes, Assessing the 
Counterfactual: The Efficacy of Drug Interdiction Absent Racial Profiling, 
54 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1113, 1132-35 (2005). 
83 See Gary Ford, The New Jim Crow: Male and Female, South and North, 
from Cradle to Grave, Perception and Reality: Racial Disparity and Bias in 
America's Criminal Justice System, 11 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 324, 336 
(2010). 
84 See Baradaran, supra note 81, at 165-66. 
85 See generally, Mathew Swinburne & Kathleen Hoke, State Efforts to 
Create an Inclusive Marijuana Industry in the Shadow of the Unjust War 
on Drugs, 15 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 235, 249-55 (2020) 
86 See Swinburne, & Hoke, supra note 85 at 250-53. 
87 See Gene Taras, Note, High Time for Change: How Legalizing 
Marijuana Could Help Narrow the Racial Divide in the United States, 24 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 565, 572 (2016). 
88 ALEXANDER, supra note 76, at 6. 
89 Id. at 59. 
90 Jamal Hagler, 8 Facts You Should Know About the Criminal Justice 










Incarceration scars former offenders.  A drug conviction 
brings people into the criminal justice system where they face 
prosecution, jail time, and a conviction that will remain on their 
record, often without specifying the nature of the drug 
offense.91 Convictions impact many areas of life such as child 
custody disputes, immigration, voting rights, public housing, 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) 
benefits, financial aid for secondary education, sentencing for 
future offenses, and employment.92 As many Americans live 
everyday with these scars from the war on drugs, state 
legalization of cannabis shows signs of hope. 
III. STATE LEGALIZATION AND SOCIAL EQUITY 
 As of 2020, eleven states have legalized recreational 
cannabis use.93 This trend in legalization promises cannabis 
entrepreneurs plentiful business opportunities.94 Despite the 
disparate racial impact of the war on drugs, the American 
cannabis industry is dominated by white men.95 Several factors 
cause this disparity, including financial assets, criminal records, 
and concerns about cannabis’s legality.96 To combat this 
disparity, some states have created social equity programs 
encouraging minority participation in the recreational cannabis 
industry.97 Various accommodation systems have been 
challenged by opponents over the years on both Constitutional 
and effectiveness grounds.98  
a. STATE LEGALIZATION AND THE GREEN RUSH 
 The long journey to cannabis legalization began in 1996 
when voters in Arizona and California legalized medicinal 
 
91 Schlussel, supra note 21, at 900. 
92 Schlussel, supra note 21, at 900; Vitiello, supra note 30, at 806-07. 
93 Winn, supra note 10, at 61-62. 
94 See Bender, supra note 47, at 695. 
95 United States v. Rodriguez, 147 F. Supp. 3d 1278, 1293 (D.N.M. 
2015). 
96 Bender, supra note 47, at 696-97. 
97 Krane, supra note 19. 
98  See Khiara M. Bridges, Class-Based Affirmative Action, or the Lies that 
We Tell About the Insignificance of Race, 96 B.U. L. REV. 55 (2016). 
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cannabis.99 In 2012, Colorado and Washington became the first 
states to legalize recreational cannabis.100 Early cannabis 
legalization campaigns relied on various policy arguments that 
cannabis legalization would: (1) increase state government tax 
revenue, (2) lower government spending on cannabis 
enforcement, (3) increase privacy rights, and (4) improve public 
health.101 Early campaigns rarely focused on the disparate 
impact of the war on drugs on minority communities.102 
Instead, some campaigns used subtle racial dog whistles 
appealing to white anxieties.103 For example, one ad in Colorado 
contained a voice-over saying “Let’s vote for the good guys and 
against the bad guys. Let’s have marijuana tax money go to our 
schools rather than criminals in Mexico.”104 These early 
campaigns ignored the racial injustices of the drug war.105 
 This avoidance changed when Washington, D.C. 
prominently used racial justice messaging in their successful 
cannabis legalization campaign.106 The D.C. campaign website’s 
slogan was “Legalization Ends Discrimination,”107 and their 
website noted that “billions of dollars [were] wasted on racially 
 
99 Pearson v. McCaffrey, 139 F. Supp. 2d 113, 116 n.1 (D.D.C. 2001) 
(“Arizona and California voters approved medical marijuana laws in 
1996.”); Michael D. Moberly & Charitie L. Hartsig, The Arizona 
Medical Marijuana Act: A Pot Hole for Employers?, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 
415, 430 (2012). Arizona’s medicinal cannabis law was voided 
because of a language technicality in the statute. See Lewis A. 
Grossman, Life, Liberty, [and the Pursuit of Happiness]: Medical 
Marijuana Regulation in Historical Context, 74 FOOD & DRUG L.J.. 280, 
308 (2019). 
100 See Melanie Reid, The Quagmire that Nobody in the Federal 
Government Wants to Talk About: Marijuana, 44 N.M. L. REV. 169, 177 
(2014). 
101 Schlussel, supra note 21, at 905-06. 
102 Bender, supra note 47, at 693. 
103 Schlussel, supra note 21, at 909. 
104 Colorado Marijuana Initiative 2012, Yes on 64 TV Ad – “Vote for 
Colorado,” YOUTUBE (Oct. 6, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1KAOq7XX2OY. 
105 See Schlussel, supra note 21, at 886-87. 
106 Bender, supra note 47, at 694. 
107 DCMJ, Legalize. Legalization Ends Discrimination. (photograph), 
FACEBOOK (Nov. 10, 2014), 
https://www.facebook.com/dcmj2014/photos/pb.405634282868085
.-2207520000.1462594391./679469155484595. 





biased arrests.”108 Subsequently, both California’s and 
Massachusetts’s successful legalization campaigns prominently 
featured racial justice arguments.109 In California’s legalization 
campaign, organizers aired ads highlighting racial inequality in 
the war on drugs.110 One ad, narrated by Jay-Z, stated “[T]he 
war on drugs exploded the U.S. prison population 
disproportionality, locking away blacks and Latinos.”111 Like 
California, Massachusetts also used racial justice messaging in 
their legalization campaign.112 Massachusetts’s cannabis 
legalization website reads, “Too often young people and people 
of color can’t find a job or take care of their families because 
they have a petty arrest record for possessing marijuana.”113 
The website also highlighted the racial disparity of the drug 
war. “In Massachusetts, people of color are three times more 
likely to be arrested for marijuana possession.”114 These 
campaigns show that racial justice is a growing reason that 
voters legalize cannabis. 
 While some jurisdictions have highlighted racial justice 
in their campaigns the benefits of cannabis legalization have 
stark racial disparities. In the states that have legalized cannabis 
it is taxed heavily (in Washington, for example, the effective tax 
rate on cannabis is 46%).115 Cannabis’s taxation scheme is 
regressive, imposing steep costs on less affluent users.116 This 
steep tax leads buyers of color to turn to still illegal channels in 
the cannabis market, perpetuating drug arrests and 
incarceration.117  
 
108 About, DCMJ, http://dcmj.org/about (last visited Mar. 07, 2020). 
109 Schlussel, supra note 21, at 917. 
110 Id.  
111 Jay Z - The War on Drugs: From Prohibition to Gold Rush | Yes on 64, 
YOUTUBE (Oct. 18, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eI5mE5PBGJg. 
112 Schlussel, supra note 21, at 918. 
113 Why Vote YES on Question 4?, Yes on 4: Regulate Mass., 
https://www.regulatemassachusetts.org/yeson4 
[https://perma.cc/M3LV-89T3] (last visited Mar. 07, 2020). 
114 Id.  
115 See Bernie Becker, Cannabis was supposed to be a tax windfall for 
states. The reality has been different., POLITICO (Oct. 14, 2019), 
https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2019/10/14/marijuana-
tax-revenue-001062. 
116 Vitiello, supra note 30, at 818. 
117 Bender, supra note 47, at 699-700. 
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  The continued perpetuation of drug convictions 
continues to lock out minorities from the recreational cannabis 
industry. State policies vary in granting recreational cannabis 
licenses to a person with a felony conviction.118 Alaska, 
Colorado, Maine, and Nevada forbid granting a license to 
someone with a felony conviction.119 Colorado and Maine have 
time limits on the offense.120 Colorado only considers felony 
offenses in the past five years and Maine considers 
disqualifying drug offenses in the past ten years.121 
 The next category of jurisdictions takes a holistic view 
of an applicant. In both Oregon and Washington, a drug offense 
is not disqualifying but is considered in granting the license.122 
California forbids all felony offenses except for drug-related 
felony convictions for cannabis.123 In excluding cannabis 
offenses, the California legislature intended to address 
“racially, ethnically, and economically diverse populations.”124 
The final category of jurisdictions add additional points 
towards an application for an applicant convicted of a prior 
drug offense. The only jurisdictions in this category are Illinois, 
Massachusetts, and Michigan.125 
 
118 Maya Rahwanji,“Hash”ing Out Inequality in the Legal Recreational 
Cannabis Industry, 39 N.W. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 340-41 (2019). 
119 ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 17.38.200(i) (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-
43.4-306(g)(I)-(II) (2016); 7 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2447(1)(B) (2017); 
NEV. REV. STAT. c.453D.210(f)(1)-(2) (2017). 
120 Rahwanji, supra note 118, at 342. 
121 COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43.4-306(g)(I)-(II) (2016); 7 ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 2447(1)(B) (2017). 
122 OR. REV. STAT. § 475B.045(3) (2017); WASH. REV. CODE 314-55-
040(1)-(3) (2017). Despite this holistic review the state cannabis 
commission sometimes is harsh when reviewing applications. See 
Haines-Marchel v. Wash. State Liquor & Cannabis Bd., 406 P.3d 1199 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2017) (upholding state cannabis commission’s 
denial of recreational cannabis license because applicant’s spouse 
was an incarcerated felon). 
123CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11370.4, 11054 (2017). 
124 S.B. 94, 2017-2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). 
125 MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV.  § 333.27958(1)(j) (LexisNexis 2018); 410 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 130 / 115 (West 2020); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
94G § 5(b)(4) (2016). Illinois has gone further and is in the process of 
expunging the criminal records of 800,000 people convicted of 
purchasing or possessing 30 grams or less of marijuana. See John 
O’Connor, 800,000 Eligible to Clear Their Record in Illinois Legal Pot, 
 





 Even if an applicant lacks a criminal record or has their 
record expunged, minorities still face financial barriers for entry 
into the cannabis industry. Entering the cannabis industry 
comes with costs that other businesses don’t face.126 Application 
fees for obtaining a license to sell cannabis can be as high as 
$200,000 and in some states the application fee is 
nonrefundable.127  
 If an applicant is granted a license, running a cannabis 
business has unique costs. Cannabis as a commodity requires 
specialized legal work because it is highly regulated.128 The 
costs of an attorney for a cannabis business owner can reach 
$50,000 annually.129  A cannabis business owner often must 
invest additional money in security such as camera feeds, 
complex security systems, and armed-guards for protection.130 
These added costs are because cannabis remains largely 
a cash-only business.131  Major credit card companies prohibit 
using their cards for cannabis purposes because cannabis is still 
federally illegal.132 An estimated 70% of cannabis businesses 
have no relationships with financial institutions and solely use 
cash for all business transactions.133 This model places cannabis  
 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, (Jun. 26, 2019), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/illinois/articles/2019-
06-26/marijuana-legalization-allows-criminal-record-clearing. 
126 Nick Kovacevich, The Hidden Costs of The Cannabis Business, 




128 Sam Kamin & Eli Wald, Marijuana Lawyers: Outlaws or Crusaders?, 
91 OR. L. REV. 869, 904 (2013). 
129 Kovacevich, supra note 126. 
130 See Rachel Cheasty Sanders, To Weed or Not to Weed? The Colorado 
Quandary of Legitimate Marijuana Businesses and the Financial 
Institutions Who Are Unable to Serve Them, 120 PENN. ST. L. REV. 281, 
299 n. 145 (2015). 
131 Id. at 298.  
132 Gabriel J. Greenbaum, Note, What to Do with All This Green: Using 
Casino Regulations as a Model for Cannabis Industry Banking, 58 
WASHBURN L.J. 217, 223 n.50 (2019). 
133 Stuart Leavenworth, When does too much cash become a health risk? 
When you own a marijuana shop, MCCLATCHY DC (Feb. 7, 2018), 
https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-
world/national/article198941964.html.  
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businesses at a heightened risk of robbery and other types of 
violent crimes.134 
Participation in the cannabis industry requires 
substantial capital resources that many minority Americans do 
not have and are unlikely to acquire.135 A widening racial 
wealth gap exists in America.136 One analysis in 2011, found the 
average white household wealth was $111,146.00, the average 
Latino household was $8,348, and the average Black household 
wealth was $7,113.137 The high capital requirements alongside 
racial wealth disparities are a factor in low minority 
participation in the recreational cannabis industry.138 
Despite these many obstacles for minorities, the 
cannabis industry offers economic prosperity.139 By 2021, 
expected spending on legal cannabis will be $14.9 billion and 
research estimates a 25% compound growth rate from 2016 to 
2021.140 That success also reaches employees- as of 2019, 211,000 
full-time jobs in America came from the legal cannabis 
industry.141 White entrepreneurs enjoy a greater share of this 
 
134 Katherine P. Franck, Note, Cannabis Reform: High on the Banking 
Agenda, 24 N.C. BANKING INST. 165, 173 (2020). 
135Karen Mawdsley et al., Experts: Minorities Struggle for Footing in 
Lucrative Cannabis Industry, NEWS21 (Aug. 15, 2015), 
http://weedrush.news21.com/experts-minorities-struggle-for-
footing-in-lucrative-cannabis-industry.  
136 LAURA SULLIVAN ET. AL., THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP: WHY POLICY 
MATTERS 5 (2015), https://iasp.brandeis.edu/pdfs/2015/RWA.pdf. 
137 Id. at 5. 
138 See generally, Elizabeth Danquah-Brobby, Comment, Prison for 
You. Profit for Me. Systemic Racism Effectively Bars Blacks from 
Participation in Newly-Legal Marijuana Industry, 46 U. BALT. L. REV. 
523, 539 (2017). 
139 See The Arcview Group, The State of Legal Marijuana Markets, 5th 




140 See id. 
141 Bruce Barcott, As of 2019, legal cannabis has created 211,000 full-time 
jobs in America, LEAFLY (Mar. 4, 2019), 
https://www.leafly.com/news/industry/legal-cannabis-jobs-
report-2019. 





prosperity as only an estimated 17% of self-identified cannabis 
senior executives, owners or founders are minorities.142 
b. STATE SOCIAL EQUITY SYSTEMS  
 In attempting to remedy the cannabis industry’s racial 
disparities and the disparate impact of the war on drugs, some 
states have implemented social equity systems for minorities in 
the cannabis industry.143  Among the states that have legalized 
recreational cannabis, only five utilize social equity systems.144 
These states are: California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
and Washington.145 State social equity systems vary in these 
states.146 California’s social equity system focuses on assisting 
municipalities with their respective systems instead of a blanket 
 
142 Meera Jagannathan, People of color are reclaiming their place in a 
cannabis industry ‘built on the backs of people from marginalized 




143 Kayla Siam, Social Equity Programs in Cannabis – Worth their 
Weight?, SEYFARTH, (Feb. 27, 2020), 
https://www.blunttruthlaw.com/2020/02/social-equity-programs-
in-cannabis-worth-their-weight/. Maryland and Pennsylvania also 
provide social equity programs for minorities seeking to enter the 
medicinal cannabis market. In Maryland, the state must consider 
racial, ethnic, gender, and geographic diversity when awarding 
licenses. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 13-3306(9)(i) (2020). In 
Pennsylvania, applicants who submit a diversity plan are giving 
additional points on their application. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 
10231.615(b)(3) (2020); Medical Marijuana Permit Application, at 
http://www.health.state.pa.us/mmrtk/docs-dispensaries/D-2018-
17_Redacted.pdf (last visited May 31, 2020). Factors considered 
include diversity in the principals, operators, and employers. 
Diverse groups included are women, veterans, service-disabled 
veterans, and racial minorities. These states are not discussed further 
because they only apply for state medicinal cannabis licenses. 
144 See infra Id.  
145 CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 26244 (2019), MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV.  § 
333.27958 (2018); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 130 / 115(a-5) (West 
2020); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 13-3306(9)(i) (2020); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94G, § 4 (West 2019); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §  
10231.615 (2020); H.B. 2870, 2020 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020). 
146 Siam, supra note at 143. 
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statewide system.147 Washington awards social equity 
applicants forfeited, canceled, revoked or otherwise unissued 
recreational cannabis licenses.148 The states of Illinois, 
Massachusetts, and Michigan provide social equity programs 
for communities disproportionality impacted by the war on 
drugs.149 While Oklahoma does not have a social equity system 
the state allows for an unlimited number of medicinal cannabis 
licensees and has low application fees which has created a 
diverse industry.150 
 California does not have a statewide social equity 
provision but instead assists municipalities in administering 
their social equity programs.151 The California Cannabis Bureau 
considers the effectiveness of the local jurisdiction’s program at 
remedying the disparate impact of cannabis arrests and 
convictions on certain communities.152 In 2020, California 
awarded twelve jurisdictions $30,000,000 to assist in their local 
social equity programs.153 California’s social equity program is 
unique from other states as it merely provides grants and 
assistance to municipalities without creating a blanket social 
equity program for the entire state.154 
 By contrast, Washington’s state social equity program is 
state-wide and applies to unused cannabis licenses.155 To 
qualify, the applicant must come from a disparately impacted 
 
147 CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 26244 (2019). 
148 H.B. 2870, 2020 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020). 
149 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 130 / 115(a-5) (West 2020); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 94G, § 4 (West 2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV.  § 
333.27958 (2018); Equity Programs, https://mass-cannabis-
control.com/equityprograms-2/#tab-id-2 (hereafter Massachusetts 
Social Equity Program). 
150 Siam, supra note 143. 
151 CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 26244 (2019). 
152 CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 26244(3) (2019). 
153 Compton Herald, Governor trumpets $30 million in grant funding, 
(Apr. 24, 2020), https://comptonherald.org/governor-trumpets-30-
million-grants/. 
154 See Eli McVey, Chart: Not all states’ cannabis social equity programs 
are equal, MARIJUANA BUSINESS DAILY (Aug. 20, 2019), 
https://mjbizdaily.com/chart-not-all-states-cannabis-social-equity-
programs-are-equal/. 
155 See Alison Malsbury, Washington Cannabis Finally Adopts a Social 
Equity Program, HARRIS BRICKEN (Apr. 9, 2020), 
https://harrisbricken.com/cannalawblog/washington-cannabis-
finally-adopts-a-social-equity-program/. 





area determined based on poverty and drug conviction rates.156 
The applicant must also submit a social equity plan on how they 
intend to achieve equity goals.157 The program only applies for 
licenses that were forfeited, canceled, revoked or otherwise 
unissued instead of all cannabis licenses.158 Nonetheless, the 
applications are relatively inexpensive, costing $1,480 with an 
application fee of $250.159 
 The states of Illinois, Massachusetts, and Michigan have 
enacted state-wide laws to promote opportunities for 
communities or individuals disparately impacted by the war on 
drugs that impact all cannabis licenses.160 Massachusetts’s 
cannabis laws require their cannabis commission to promote 
policies that encourage participation by communities 
disproportionality harmed by the war on drugs.161 To achieve 
these goals the Massachusetts Cannabis Commission provides 
professional training, technical assistance, and mentoring for 
those who qualify as social equity applicants.162 To qualify for 
the social equity program an applicant must meet one of the 
following criteria: residing in an area of disproportionate 
impact for at least five of the past ten years and their current 
income may not exceed 400% of federal poverty level; having a 
past drug conviction; or having been married to or the child of 
a person with drug conviction.163  
Michigan law also requires their state marihuana 
regulatory agency develop a plan to promote and encourage 
participation in the state cannabis industry for individuals who 
were disproportionality impacted by cannabis prohibition and 
enforcement.164 An applicant qualifies for Michigan’s social 
equity program if they live in a community disparately 
 




160 McVey, supra note 154. Colorado’s law applies in a similar 
fashion. H.B. 20-1424, 72nd Gen. Assemb., 2020 Reg. Sess. (Colo. 
2020) 
161 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.  ch. 94G, § 4(a1/2)(iii) (West 2019). 
162 Massachusetts Social Equity Program, supra note 149.  
163 Id.  
164 MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV.  § 333.27958(1)(j) (2020). 
304                                 8 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2020) 
 
impacted by the war on drugs.165 This is different from 
Massachusetts’s program as it does not have a length of time 
requirement.166 Like Massachusetts, Michigan offers benefits to 
qualifying social equity applicants. Michigan’s benefits are 
more expansive than Massachusetts’s. Michigan provides 
regional presentations, application assistance, reduced fees, 
and program resources for social equity participants.167 
Like Massachusetts and Michigan, Illinois also provides 
benefits for social equity applicants, but their program is 
codified into law and has specific requirements.168 An applicant 
qualifies as a social equity applicant if 51% of ownership and 
control is by individuals previously convicted of an offense 
eligible for expungement or live in disproportionality impacted 
area for at least five of the preceding ten years.169 Additionally, 
an applicant is also considered a social equity applicant if 51% 
of employees reside in a disparately impacted area, or they or a 
family member has been convicted or arrested for an offense 
eligible for expungement.170 If an applicant meets these 
requirements additional points are awarded on their 
application.171 A social equity applicant may also be awarded 
loans or grants to assist in the application process and operating 
their business by the state’s cannabis business development 
fund.172 The states of Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, and 
Washington all focus on providing social equity for areas 
disparately impacted by the war on drugs and individuals 
convicted of drugs offenses.173 These laws do not explicitly 
 
165 Michigan’s Marijuana Regulatory Agency Announces Social 
Equity Program Expansion, 
https://www.michigan.gov/lara/0,4601,7-154-89334_79571_79784-
508912--,00.html (hereafter Michigan Social Equity Program). 
166 Compare id. with Massachusetts Social Equity, supra note 149. 
167 Michigan Social Equity Program, supra note 165. 
168 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 130 / 115 (West 2019). 
169 Id.  
170 Id.  
171 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 130 / 115(a-5) (West 2019). 
172 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705 / 7-10 (West 2019). 
173 See Marcus Hernandez, Leveling the Playing Field: Various 
Approaches to Social Equity, BURNS LEVINSON (Aug. 20, 2020), 
http://www.cannabusinessadvisory.com/2020/08/20/leveling-the-
playing-field-various-approaches-to-social-equity/ 





consider race when creating accommodations but instead assist 
all people impacted by the war on drugs.174 
c. CONSTITUTIONAL AND EFFECTIVENESS CONCERNS  
 The previously discussed measures largely avoided 
race-conscious measures.175 Prior to 2018, Ohio’s state 
medicinal cannabis law utilized quotas requiring 15% of all 
licenses to be awarded to racial minorities.176 Ohio’s law 
succeeded in expanding racial diversity as over 16% of all 
licensees were minorities.177  
 Despite this success, the law was deemed 
unconstitutional as an impermissible racial quota.178 The 
Supreme Court has held policies that benefit individuals on the 
basis of race are subjected to a two-part strict scrutiny test under 
the Equal Protection Clause.179 First, to withstand strict 
scrutiny, a policy that benefits individuals on the basis of race 
must serve a “compelling” government interest.180 Second, the 
government’s method to achieve such an interest must be 
“narrowly tailored.”181 Interests the Court has found 
 
174 See generally, Siam, supra note 143. 
175 Id.  
176 Siam, supra note 143. While medicinal cannabis is not directly 
discussed in this article the Ohio law is helpful for showing the 
Constitutional defects of an explicit racial quota for potential 
legislation. 
177 Id.  
178 Pharmacann Ohio, LLC v. Williams, No. 17-CV-10962, 2018 WL 
7500067 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Nov. 15. 2018).  
179 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323-28 (2003). 
180 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326. 
181 Id. The Court has interpreted “narrowly tailored” to mean policies 
that benefit individuals on the basis of race must tightly fit the 
compelling interest, avoid unduly burdening adversely impacted 
individuals, and consider race-neutral means for achieving the 
government’s interest. Id. at 333-43. 
306                                 8 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2020) 
 
“compelling” have involved diversity in education182 and 
remedying past discrimination in a particular industry.183 
 This framework was used by the Franklin County Court 
of Common Pleas in Pharmacann Ohio, LLC. v. Williams where 
the court considered the Ohio law’s set-aside provision.184 In 
Pharmacann, the plaintiff, received a final score in their 
medicinal cannabis license application that would otherwise 
qualify it for a license.185 However, the plaintiff was denied a 
license because two other lower scoring applicants were 
members of a disadvantaged group.186  
The court examined the state’s racial quota under the 
standard of strict scrutiny.187 Under strict scrutiny, the racial 
classification must be justified by a compelling government 
interest and must be narrowly tailored to achieve that goal.188 
The court first considered whether the classification was a 
compelling interest.189 The defendant provided evidence that 
the legislature sought to remedy racial disparities of African 
Americans and Latinos regarding arrest rates for cannabis 
offenses.190 The court found this evidence was not enough to 
support a finding of discrimination within the brand new Ohio 
medicinal cannabis industry for African Americans, Latinos, 
American Indians, and Asians.191 The defendant also offered 
evidence of discrimination in government procurement.192 This 
evidence was unpersuasive as the court held that 
discrimination must be directly related to that particular 
 
182 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-14 (1978) 
(holding race can be considered in educational institutions so long as 
it is not decisive in admittance) (Powell, J.). But see, Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271-72 (2003) (holding college policy that 
made race the decisive factor for admittance constituted an 
unconstitutional racial classification). 
183 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490-92 (1989) 
(O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, J.). 
184 Pharmacann, 2018 WL 7500067 at *2. 
185 Id. 
186 Id.  
187 Id. at *3. 
188 Id. at *5-*6 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Edn., 476 U.S. 267, 274 
(1986)). 
189 Id. at *4. 
190 Pharmacann, 2018 WL 7500067 at *10. 
191 Id.  
192 Id.  





industry, here medicinal cannabis, which was not 
demonstrated.193 
Though the court did not find the state had provided a 
compelling interest, the court considered whether the remedy 
was narrowly tailored.194 The court found that the quota was 
not narrowly tailored because the legislature did not consider 
alternative race-neutral remedies such as giving preference to 
companies owned by those previously convicted or arrested on 
a cannabis offense.195 Because the Ohio law failed both prongs, 
the court held the law was unconstitutional.196 In 2019, the 
Madison County Court of Common Pleas considered the same 
Ohio law and followed Pharmacann’s reasoning to find the 
quota was again unconstitutional.197 
Race-based classifications have been challenged beyond 
Constitutional grounds and on policy grounds. First, race-
based programs are challenged by opponents as warping 
meritocracy.198 Instead of taking a holistic view of an 
individual’s characteristics, race is given special 
consideration.199 Another argument made by opponents is that 
race-based classification stoke racial tension because it divides 
individual’s based on their race.200 Finally, opponents argue 
 
193 Id.  
194 Id. at *13. 
195 Id. at *14. 
196 Id. at *20. 
197 Pure Ohio Wellness, LLC v. State of Ohio Brd. Of Pharmacy, CVH 
20190197 (C.P. Madison, Cnty, Ohio Nov. 04, 2019). 
198 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 532-33 (1980) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); Jared M. Mellott, Note, The Diversity Rationale for 
Affirmative Action in Employment After Grutter: The Case for 
Containment, 48 WM. & MARY  L. REV. 1091, 1140 (2006) (“In a country 
that prides itself on being a meritocracy without official ranks of 
nobility attached at birth, affirmative action seems especially 
perverse.”). 
199 See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 273-74 (2003) (noting that 
system that assigned points based on race hindered other 
considerations about an individual’s background or other 
characteristics beyond race); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 533. 
200 Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 603 (1990) (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“Those who believe that racial preferences 
can help… display, and reinforce, a manner of thinking by race....”). 
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that broad race-based quotas burden individuals who did not 
cause the racial injury.201 
While these arguments have merit, state social equity 
programs that focus on remedying individuals directly harmed 
by the war on drugs offer the best remedial measures because 
they survive Constitutional scrutiny and help those directly 
impacted by the war on drugs.202 It is true that the war on drugs 
had a disparate impact on minorities203 and that laws giving 
preferences to individuals directly impacted by the war on 
drugs would have a disparate impact favoring minorities.204 
While this is true, these laws would not be found 
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has held that a law that 
has a disparate impact on racial minorities is unconstitutional 
under the Equal Protection Clause only if the law had a 
discriminatory purpose.205 Laws that favor individuals directly 
impacted by the war on drugs would likely pass Constitutional 
scrutiny.206 The laws are not adopted for a discriminatory 
purpose but instead serve as an accommodation for all 
individuals directly impacted by the war on drugs regardless of 
race. These laws are race neutral as they can apply to 
individuals of all races who were directly impacted by the war 
on drugs.  
Aside from Constitutionality concerns over certain 
social equity systems, effectiveness concerns are also relevant. 
Data regarding diversity in the cannabis industry is limited. 
The social equity initiatives in Illinois and Michigan are just 
beginning and more time is required to determine their 
effectiveness. In Massachusetts only 1.2% of cannabis 
 
201 Tung Yin, A Carbolic Smoke Ball for the Nineties: Class-Based 
Affirmative Action, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 213, 215 (1997) (reviewing 
RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996)). 
202 See Robert A. Mikos, What Makes Illinois’s New Adult-Use 
Marijuana Law Noteworthy . . ., MARIJUANA L., POL’Y, & AUTH. BLOG 
(Jun. 28. 2019), 
https://my.vanderbilt.edu/marijuanalaw/2019/06/what-makes-
illinoiss-new-adult-use-marijuana-law-noteworthy/ 
203 See infra notes 20-93 and accompanying text. 
204 See Brown, supra note 78, at 207. 
205 Wash. v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 237 (1976). 
206 See Mikos, supra note 200. 





businesses are owned by racial minorities.207 Massachusetts set 
aside 123 licenses for social equity applicants and only 10 
people applied.208 Commentators suggests the lack of 
participation stem from the high costs: an applicant can expect 
to pay $50,000 to $60,000 in costs to complete an application.209 
A better way forward must exist. 
IV. CLEARING THE HAZE: PROPER STATE ACTION 
 Diversifying the recreational cannabis industry requires 
action by state governments. This section offers a statute aimed 
to provide inexpensive cannabis licenses and continuous 
mentorship for applicants while also discouraging illegal 
cannabis markets.  
a. STATUTE RECOMMENDATION  
 Based on the experiences of various state social equity 
systems for minority cannabis entrepreneurs, I propose the 
following language be used in state cannabis statutes: 
§ X. Cannabis Social Equity 
(a) For any dispensing organization registered on or after July 
1, 2021, the State Cannabis Bureau (“SCB”) shall award not 
less than 20% of all available licenses to applicants that qualify 
as Social Equity Applicants.  
 
207 Erin Magner, The cannabis world has a diversity problem, but 
Cannaclusive’s founders are seeking to change that, WELL + GOOD, (Mar. 
4, 2020), https://www.wellandgood.com/good-
advice/cannaclusive-minorities-cannabis-industry/ (noting that 
11.5% of companies in the traditional economy are owned by 
minorities). 
208 Jeanette DeForge, State cannabis law offers licenses for marginalized 
populations but few apply, experts said in Holyoke panel discussion, 




209 Jeff Smith, Medical cannabis business opportunities could swell in 
several states this year, MARIJUANA BUSINESS DAILY (Feb. 14, 2020), 
https://mjbizdaily.com/medical-cannabis-business-opportunities-
could-swell-in-several-states-this-year/. 
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“Social Equity Applicant” means an applicant that is a state 
resident that meets one of the following criteria: 
(1) an applicant with at least 51% ownership and control by 
one or more individuals who have resided for at least 5 of the 
preceding 10 years in a Disproportionately Impacted Area; 
(2) an applicant with at least 51% of ownership and control by 
one or more individuals who have been arrested for, convicted 
of, a past drug offense; or have been married to or a child of a 
person with a past drug arrest or conviction in the state. 
(b) The SCB shall make available the following for a successful 
social equity applicant: 
(1) Application Assistance and continued business operation 
assistance. 
(2) A 50% reduction in renewal fees. 
(3) The SCB shall partner with other state agencies that are 
relevant to individuals participating in the cannabis industry. 
(4) The SCB shall award social equity applicants grants in 
gaining entry to, and successfully operating in, the State’s 
regulated cannabis marketplace. 
(c) The tax on retail cannabis sales will be established at seven 
percent (7%) of the gross amount received by the seller. 
(d) The application fee shall be two hundred fifty dollars 
($250).  The application fee is refundable if the application is 
rejected.  
b. STATUTE ANALYSIS  
 This statutory language combines the best features of 
the existing state social equity programs. It also takes into 
consideration lessons from state courts. It encourages the 
continued participation of those disparately impacted by the 
war on drugs in the burgeoning recreational cannabis industry. 
This section considers the purpose and effect of each element of 
the statute and how the statute improves upon existing law. 
i. SECTION (A) – WHO IS A SOCIAL EQUITY APPLICANT 
UNDER THE STATUE 
 Section (a) of this statute describes who is a social equity 
candidate. The statute begins with a set-aside requirement. This 
aspect follows the Ohio law that required 15% of state 
medicinal cannabis licensees to be awarded to racial 





minorities.210 The Ohio law was successful in achieving racial 
diversity but was found to be an unconstitutional racial 
quota.211 The proposed statute learns from the lessons of the 
Ohio statute and is racially neutral as it applies to all individuals 
who were directly impacted by the war on drugs regardless of 
race.  
 The statute then describes who is a social equity 
applicant. The language of this statute combines aspects of 
Illinois’s and Massachusetts’s social equity programs. The 
statute defines a social equity applicant as an individual who 
either lives in an area disproportionality impacted by the war 
on drugs, has an arrest of conviction for drug arrest or is 
married to or a child of someone arrested or convicted of a drug 
offense. This language allows for an individual who lives in an 
area disparately impacted by the war on drugs to be given 
reparations. The statute contains a residency requirement to 
prevent individuals from owning property briefly to meet the 
requirement.212 The statute then also turns to individuals with 
a drug arrests or convictions. This language protects those 
directly impacted by the war on the drugs. The statute omits 
Illinois’s problematic language of considering someone a social 
equity applicant by having 51% of employees to be 
disproportionality impacted by the war on drugs. This 
omission seeks to focus on empowering the ownership of 
cannabis businesses and not merely employment.213 Ownership 
of a business comes with more economic potential.214 This 
language prevents individuals from manipulating the social 
 
210 Pharmacann, 2018 WL 7500067 at *8. 
211 Siam, supra note 143. 
212 Cannabis residency requirements ensure the licensee has a 
connection to the local community, profits stay within the 
community, and prevent large corporations from controlling the 
cannabis industry. See Daniel Shortt, Marijuana Industry Residency 
Requirements, HARRIS BRICKEN (Apr. 28, 2015), 
https://harrisbricken.com/cannalawblog/marijuana-industry-
residency-requirements/. 
213 See Amanda Vinicky, Will Illinois’ Marijuana Law Meet its Social 
Equity Aims?, WTTW (Nov. 21, 2019), 
https://news.wttw.com/2019/11/21/will-illinois-marijuana-law-
meet-its-social-equity-aims. 
214 See Id.  
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equity program by having a majority white ownership who are 
still social equity applicants.215 
ii. SECTION (B) – SOCIAL EQUITY APPLICANT ASSISTANCE 
 Section (b) addresses the various forms of assistance the 
SCB may provide applicants. The forms of assistance are 
codified providing clear guidance for the SCB. These forms of 
assistance help to break down barriers that social equity 
applicants face in entering the cannabis market. First, this 
statute helps applicants navigate the application process by 
providing direct assistance when completing the application.216 
Second, reducing application and renewal fees helps remedy 
the fact that minority family wealth is significantly less than 
that of white families.217 This provision helps remove an early 
barrier for poorer applicants. Third, by partnering with various 
state agencies relevant to the cannabis industry the state 
provides applicants who are often first-time business owners 
assistance in operating a complicated business.218 Fourth, this 
portion acknowledges the heavy costs of operating a cannabis 
business and provides applicants with continued monetary 
support.219 
iii. SECTION (C) – WEAKENING THE ILLEGAL MARKET 
 Section (c) attempts to weaken the existing illegal 
cannabis markets and keep profits in social equity applicant’s 
hands. A low tax ensures people use legal channels to purchase 
inexpensive cannabis. It learns from the lessons of California 
 
215 See Josh McGhee, ‘Freeway’ Rick Ross’ advice to black Chicagoans 
heading into the legal marijuana business: don’t sell out, CHICAGO 




216 Vinicky, supra note 213. 
217 SULLIVAN, supra note 136, at 5. 
218 See Sarah Ravani, Oakland’s groundbreaking cannabis equity program 
showing modest results so far, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (May 25, 
2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Oakland-s-
groundbreaking-cannabis-equity-13895654.php. 
219 See Krane, supra note 19 (describing the hefty costs of cannabis 
business such as added security, and legal fees). 





which imposes a high tax on cannabis sales that is incredibly 
problematic.220 Experts estimate that in California legal sales of 
cannabis will be $3 billion in revenue, compared to $8.7 billion 
in illegal sales.221 The state’s high cannabis tax caused California 
to reduce its expected revenue from cannabis sales.222 By 
contrast, Oklahoma’s tax on medicinal cannabis is the same rate 
as this proposed statute and the state’s revenue on medicinal 
cannabis sales is exceeding analysts’ wildest expectations.223 
Finally, keeping the tax on cannabis low is essential to avoid 
another war on drugs.224 Even after legalization, drug 
enforcement continues to  have a disparate impact on 
minorities.225 
iv. SECTION (D) – LOW BARRIERS TO ENTRY 
 Section (d) avoids the mistakes of other states that create 
a barrier to entry in the cannabis market due to high fees by 
copying the Washington application fee costs.226 Notably, these 
licenses apply to all state recreational cannabis licenses.227 Data 
is not available regarding diversity in Washington state’s 
recreational cannabis market. However, Oklahoma’s medicinal 
cannabis program’s low application fees has caused their state’s 
 
220 California imposes a 15% state excise tax on cannabis sales. 
Patrick McGreevy, California lawmakers say pot taxes must be cut to help 
an industry ‘on the brink’, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Jan. 17, 2020), 
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-01-17/california-
lower-pot-taxes-gavin-newsom. 
221 Scott Shackford, The Marijuana Black Market Will Keep Its Throne in 
California, Thanks to Tax Increases, REASON (Nov. 25, 2019), 
https://reason.com/2019/11/25/the-marijuana-black-market-will-
keep-its-throne-in-california-thanks-to-tax-increases/. 
222 Id.  
223 Eli McVey, Chart: Oklahoma medical marijuana sales far exceed 
expectations, MARIJUANA BUSINESS DAILY (Nov. 19, 2019), 
https://mjbizdaily.com/oklahoma-medical-marijuana-industry-on-
pace-to-hit-350-million/. 
224 Shackford, supra note 221. California is seemingly launching 
another drug war to crack down on illegal cannabis facilities. Id.  
225 See Michael Tackeff, Constructing a “Creative Reading”: Will US 
State Cannabis Legislation Threaten the Fate of the International Drug 
Control Treaties?, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 247, 253 (2018). 
226 H.B. 2870, 2020 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020). 
227 Washington’s social equity program only applies to forfeited, 
canceled, revoked or otherwise unissued cannabis licenses. Id. 
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market to be one of the most diverse in the entire nation.228 
Finally, this statute makes an application refundable if denied 
ensuring applicants that a rejected application will not be 
financially harmful.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 The war on drugs had a disparate impact on 
minorities.229 As states legalize recreational cannabis, the 
industry is increasingly dominated by rich white men.230 These 
individuals did not experience the same destructive effects of 
the war on drugs as minorities did.231 One conclusion is certain 
– states with legalized cannabis should take steps to encourage 




228 Siam, supra note 143. 
229 Amanda Chicago Lewis, How Black People are Being Shut Out of 
America's Weed Boom, BUZZFEED (Mar. 16, 2016), 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/amandachicagolewis/americas-white-
only-weed-boom?utm_term=.jkGzyOM3L#.gyaw1enPL. 
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*  See infra notes 143-173 and accompanying text. 
** Legislation will go into effect January 1, 2021. 
